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Abstract—Although previous work has demonstrated the ability 
of large energy storage (ES) units to exercise market power by 
withholding their capacity, it has adopted modeling approaches 
exhibiting certain limitations and has not analyzed the 
dependency of the extent of exercised market power on ES 
operating properties. In this paper, the decision making process 
of strategic ES is modeled through a bi-level optimization 
problem; the upper level determines the optimal extent of 
capacity withholding at different time periods, maximizing the 
ES profit, while the lower level represents endogenously the 
market clearing process. This problem is solved after converting 
it to a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
(MPEC) and linearizing the latter through suitable techniques. 
Case studies on a test market quantitatively analyze the extent of 
capacity withholding and its impact on ES profit and social 
welfare for different scenarios regarding the power and energy 
capacity of ES. 
Index Terms—Electricity markets, energy storage, market 
power, mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. 
NOMENCLATURE 
A. Indices and Sets 
ݐ  Index of time periods running from 1 to ܶ 
݅  Index of producers running from 1 to ܫ 
ܾ  Index of generation blocks running from 1 to ܤ 
ܿ  Index of demand blocks running from 1 to ܥ 
 
B. Parameters 
ܶ Length of market horizon (hours) 
ߣ௜,௕
ீ  Marginal cost of block ܾ of producer ݅ (£/MWh) 
݃௜,௕
௠௔௫  Maximum power output of block  ܾ of producer ݅ 
(MW) 
ߣ௧
஽  Marginal benefit of block ܿ of demand at time period 
 ݐ (£/MWh) 
݀௧,௖
௠௔௫ Maximum power consumption of block ܿ of demand 
at time period  ݐ (MW) 
ݏ௠௔௫  Power capacity of ES (MW) 
ܧ௖௔௣ Energy capacity of ES (MWh) 
ܧ௠௜௡  Minimum energy limit of ES (MWh) 
ܧ௠௔௫  Maximum energy limit of ES (MWh) 
ܧ଴ Initial energy level in ES (MWh) 
ߟ௖ Charging efficiency of ES 
ߟௗ Discharging efficiency of ES 
 
C. Variables 
݇௧ Capacity withholding strategy of ES at time period ݐ 
݃௜,௧,௕ Power output of block ܾ of producer ݅ at time period 
ݐ (MW) 
݀௧,௖ Power consumption of block  ܿ of demand at time 
period ݐ (MW) 
ݏ௧
௖ Charging power of ES at time period ݐ (MW) 
ݏ௧
ௗ Discharging power of ES at time period ݐ (MW) 
ܧ௧ Energy level in ES at the end of period ݐ (MWh) 
ߣ௧  Market clearing price at time period ݐ (£/MWh) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After the deregulation of the energy sector, electricity 
markets are better described in terms of imperfect rather than 
perfect competition. In this setting, market participants do not 
necessarily act as price takers. Participants of large size are 
able to behave strategically and exercise market power, i.e. 
influence the electricity prices and increase their profits 
beyond the competitive equilibrium levels, through strategic 
bids and offers [1]. Previous work on imperfect electricity 
markets has mainly focused on optimizing market strategies of 
strategic electricity producers [2] and consumers [3]. 
However, the increasing penetration of energy storage 
(ES) technologies, driven by their significant value in 
emerging low-carbon power systems [4], has recently 
attracted significant research interest in exploring the role of 
ES in imperfect electricity markets. The first aspect of this 
research lies in analysing the impact of ES on the extent of 
market power exercised by strategic producers. Our previous 
work has demonstrated that ES reduces the ability of 
exercising market power at peak periods and increases it at 
off-peak periods, with the former reduction dominating the 
latter increase and resulting in an overall positive impact for 
the social efficiency of the market [5].  
The second aspect lies in exploring the potential of ES to 
exercise market power for its own benefit. Previous work has 
demonstrated the ability of large ES units to exercise market 
power by withholding their capacity, leading to additional 
storage profits but loss of social welfare [6]-[8]. However, the 
modeling approaches adopted in that work exhibit certain 
limitations. Sioshansi [6]-[7] calculates analytically market 
equilibria in a simplified two-period market model; this 
complex analytical calculation cannot be easily extended to 
realistic market models involving a much larger number of 
clearing periods. In [8], a Cournot model of imperfect 
electricity markets is employed, where the impact of strategic 
storage on market prices is modeled through an inverse 
demand function. However, the parameters of this function 
are determined through exogenous data and therefore cannot 
accurately capture the impacts of the market’s generation and 
demand characteristics on price formation. Finally, none of 
the above papers analyses the dependency of the extent of 
market power exercised by strategic storage on its operational 
characteristics. 
This paper addresses the above challenges. The decision 
making process of strategic storage is modeled through a bi-
level optimization problem, where the upper level determines 
the optimal extent of capacity withholding by strategic 
storage at different time periods, maximizing the storage 
profit, while the lower level represents endogenously the 
market clearing process. This problem is solved after 
converting it to a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC) and linearizing the latter through 
suitable techniques. A set of case studies on a test market 
with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution quantitatively 
analyze the extent of capacity withholding and its impact on 
storage profit and social welfare at different time periods and 
for different scenarios regarding the power rating and energy 
capacity of strategic storage.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
models and theoretically demonstrates the ability of strategic 
storage to exercise market power through capacity 
withholding. Section III formulates the bi-level optimization 
model expressing the decision making of strategic storage 
and presents the equivalent MPEC and Mixed-Integer Linear 
Program (MILP) formulations. Case studies and illustrative 
results are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V 
discusses conclusions and future extensions of this work. 
II. MODELLING AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ENERGY 
STORAGE CAPACITY WITHHOLDING 
ES can exercise market power through capacity 
withholding i.e. by reporting lower than its actual power 
capacity to the market. In order to quantitatively capture the 
extent of capacity withholding at different time periods, the 
offered charging and discharging power capacity at period ݐ 
is given by the actual power capacity multiplied by a factor 
(1 − ݇௧), where the value of the decision variable 0 ≤ ݇௧ ≤1 
represents the capacity withholding strategy of storage at ݐ. If 
݇௧ = 0, storage behaves competitively and reveals its actual 
capacity to the market at ݐ . If ݇௧ > 0, storage behaves 
strategically and reports lower than its actual capacity to the 
market at ݐ. 
Fig. 1 illustrates, in a price-quantity graph, the ability of 
ES to exercise market power through capacity withholding in 
a simplified market representation involving only two periods 
(one peak and one off-peak period) and inelastic demand. The 
solid curve represents in a simplified fashion the aggregate 
marginal cost curve of the generation side - characterized by 
an increasing slope [1] - and vertical dashed lines represent 
the system demand in different cases; the intersection of the 
marginal cost curve with a vertical line determines the market 
clearing price in the respective case. Superscripts ܿ  and ݏ 
denote competitive and strategic behavior of ES respectively, 
while subscripts 1 and 2 denote off-peak and peak time 
periods respectively. 
As discussed in [5], the operation of competitive ES in the 
electricity market flattens the (net) demand profile by i) 
charging and thus increasing demand during off-peak time 
periods from ଵܳ to ଵܳ௖  and ii) discharging and thus reducing 
demand during peak time periods from ܳଶ to ܳଶ௖ . By acting 
strategically and offering less power capacity to the market, 
ES limits its flattening effect on the system demand profile, 
since it i) charges less and thus increases less the demand 
during off-peak time periods (from ଵܳ  to ଵܳ௦ ) and ii) 
discharges less and thus reduces less the demand during peak 
time periods (from ܳଶ to ܳଶ௦).  
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Figure 1.  Illustration of market power exercise by ES through capacity 
withholding 
Although this strategic action has a negative effect on 
social welfare, it can be beneficial for ES. In the example of 
Fig. 1, assuming a lossless ES for the sake of simplicity 
(implying that its charging and discharging quantities are 
equal, i.e. ଵܳ௖ − ଵܳ = ܳଶ − ܳଶ௖  and ଵܳ௦ − ଵܳ = ܳଶ − ܳଶ௦ ), its 
profit under competitive and strategic behavior is given by 
∆ߣ௖(ܳଶ − ܳଶ
௖) and ∆ߣ௦(ܳଶ − ܳଶ௦) respectively. This strategic 
action has a positive effect on ES profit, since it increases the 
price differential between peak and off-peak hours from ∆ߣ௖ 
to ∆ߣ௦ , as demonstrated in Fig. 1. However, it also has a 
negative effect on ES profit, since it reduces the volume of 
energy sold by storage ( ܳଶ − ܳଶ௦ < ܳଶ − ܳଶ௖ ). This mixed 
effect of capacity withholding on the profit of ES means that 
the latter needs to optimize its capacity withholding strategies 
݇௧ in order to maximize its profit in the market. 
III. OPTIMIZING CAPACITY WITHHOLDING STRATEGIES OF 
ENERGY STORAGE 
A. Bi-level Optimization Model 
Following the methodology adopted in [2] and [3] for 
modeling the decision making problem of strategic producers 
and consumers respectively, the decision making problem of 
strategic ES is modeled through a bi-level optimization 
problem, which is formulated as: 
(Upper level) 
max{௞೟} ∑ ߣ௧(ݏ௧
ௗ − ݏ௧
௖)௧  (1) 
subject to: 
0 ≤ ݇௧ ≤ 1, ∀ݐ (2) 
(Lower level) 
max
ቄ௚೔,೟,್,ௗ೟,೎,௦೟
೎,௦೟
೏,ா೟ቅ
∑ ߣ௧,௖
஽ ݀௧,௖௧,௖ − ∑ ߣ௜,௕
ீ ݃௜,௧,௕௜,௧,௕  (3) 
subject to: 
∑ ݀௧,௖௖ + ݏ௧
௖ − ݏ௧
ௗ − ∑ ݃௜,௧,௕௜,௕ = 0: ߣ௧, ∀ݐ (4) 
0 ≤ ݃௜,௧,௕ ≤ ݃௜,௕
௠௔௫: ߤ௜,௧,௕
ି , ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା , ∀݅, ∀ݐ, ∀ܾ (5) 
0 ≤ ݀௧,௖ ≤ ݀௧,௖
௠௔௫: ߥ௧,௖
ି , ߥ௧,௖
ା , ∀ݐ, ∀ܿ (6) 
ܧ௧ = ܧ௧ିଵ + ߟ
௖ݏ௧
௖ − ݏ௧
ௗ ߟௗ⁄ : ߦ௧, ∀ݐ (7) 
ܧ௠௜௡ ≤ ܧ௧ ≤ ܧ
௠௔௫: ߨ௧
ି, ߨ௧
ା, ∀ݐ (8) 
0 ≤ ݏ௧
௖ ≤ (1 − ݇௧)ݏ
௠௔௫: ߩ௧
ି, ߩ௧
ା, ∀ݐ (9) 
0 ≤ ݏ௧
ௗ ≤ (1 − ݇௧)ݏ
௠௔௫: ߪ௧
ି, ߪ௧
ା, ∀ݐ (10) 
ܧ଴ = ܧ்: ߮ (11) 
The upper level (UL) problem determines the optimal 
capacity withholding strategies ݇௧  maximizing the profit of 
the ES participant (1). This problem is subject to the limits of 
the capacity withholding strategies (2) and the lower level 
(LL) problem (3)-(11).  The latter represents the market 
clearing process, maximizing the social welfare (3), subject to 
demand-supply balance constraints (4) (the Lagrangian 
multipliers ߣ௧ of which constitute the market clearing prices), 
generation and demand limits (5)-(6) and the operational 
constraints of ES (7)-(11). 
These two problems are coupled, since the capacity 
withholding strategies determined by the UL problem affect 
constraints (9)-(10) of the LL problem, while the market 
clearing prices and storage charging / discharging dispatch 
determined by the LL problem affect the objective function (1) 
of the UL problem.  
B. MPEC Formulation 
In order to solve this bi-level optimization problem, the LL 
problem is replaced by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
optimality conditions, which is enabled by the continuity and 
convexity of the LL problem. This converts the bi-level 
problem to an MPEC which is formulated as: 
max௏ ∑ ߣ௧(ݏ௧
ௗ − ݏ௧
௖)௧  (12) 
where: 
ܸ = {݇௧, ݃௜,௧,௕, ݀௧,௖, ݏ௧
௖, ݏ௧
ௗ, ܧ௧, ߣ௧, ߤ௜,௧,௕
ି , ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା , ߥ௧,௖
ି , ߥ௧,௖
ା , ߦ௧, 
ߨ௧
ି, ߨ௧
ା, ߩ௧
ି, ߩ௧
ା, ߪ௧
ି, ߪ௧
ା, ߮} (13) 
subject to: 
(2), (4), (7), (11) 
ߣ௜,௕
ீ − ߣ௧ − ߤ௜,௧,௕
ି + ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା = 0, ∀݅, ∀ݐ, ∀ܾ (14) 
−ߣ௧,௖
஽ + ߣ௧ − ߥ௧,௖
ି + ߥ௧,௖
ା = 0, ∀ݐ, ∀ܿ (15) 
ߣ௧ − ߩ௧
ି + ߩ௧
ା − ߟ௖ߦ௧ = 0, ∀ݐ (16) 
−ߣ௧ − ߪ௧
ି + ߪ௧
ା + ߦ௧ ߟ
ௗ⁄ = 0, ∀ݐ (17) 
−ߨ௧
ି + ߨ௧
ା + ߦ௧ − ߦ௧ାଵ = 0, ∀ݐ < ܶ (18) 
−ߨ்
ି + ߨ்
ା + ߦ் − ߮ = 0 (19) 
0 ≤ ߤ௜,௧,௕
ି ⊥ ݃௜,௧,௕ ≥ 0, ∀݅, ∀ݐ, ∀ܾ (20) 
0 ≤ ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା ⊥ ൫݃௜,௕
௠௔௫ − ݃௜,௧,௕൯ ≥ 0, ∀݅, ∀ݐ, ∀ܾ (21) 
0 ≤ ߥ௝,௧,௖
ି ⊥ ௝݀,௧,௖ ≥ 0, ∀݆, ∀ݐ, ∀ܿ (22) 
0 ≤ ߥ௝,௧,௖
ା ⊥ ൫ ௝݀,௧,௖
௠௔௫ − ௝݀,௧,௖൯ ≥ 0, ∀݆, ∀ݐ, ∀ܿ (23) 
0 ≤ ߨ௧
ି ⊥ (ܧ௧ − ܧ
௠௜௡) ≥ 0, ∀ݐ (24) 
0 ≤ ߨ௧
ା ⊥ (ܧ௠௔௫ − ܧ௧) ≥ 0, ∀ݐ (25) 
0 ≤ ߩ௧
ି ⊥ ݏ௧
௖ ≥ 0, ∀ݐ (26) 
0 ≤ ߩ௧
ା ⊥ ((1 − ݇௧)ݏ
௠௔௫ − ݏ௧
௖) ≥ 0, ∀ݐ (27) 
0 ≤ ߪ௧
ି ⊥ ݏ௧
ௗ ≥ 0, ∀ݐ (28) 
0 ≤ ߪ௧
ା ⊥ ((1 − ݇௧)ݏ
௠௔௫ − ݏ௧
ௗ) ≥ 0, ∀ݐ (29) 
The set of decision variables (13) includes the decision 
variables of the UL and the LL problem as well as the 
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints of the 
LL problem. The KKT optimality conditions of the LL 
problem correspond to equations (4), (7), (11), (14)-(29). 
C. MILP Formulation 
However, this MPEC formulation is non-linear and thus 
any solution obtained by commercial solvers is not 
guaranteed to be globally optimal. The objective of this 
section is to transform this MPEC to a Mixed-Integer Linear 
Program (MILP) which can be efficiently solved using 
available commercial solvers. The above MPEC includes two 
types of non-linearities. The first one involves the bilinear 
objective function (12). In order to linearize it, we propose an 
approach making use of some KKT conditions. First of all, by 
making use of the demand-supply balance constraints (4), the 
objective function (12) becomes equal to: 
∑ ߣ௧݀௧,௖௧,௖ − ∑ ߣ௧݃௜,௧,௕௜,௧,௕  (30) 
By multiplying both sides of (14) by ݃௜,௧,௕, summing for 
every ݅, ݐ and ܾ and rearranging some terms we get: 
∑ ߣ௧݃௜,௧,௕௜,௧,௕ = ∑ ൫ߣ௜,௕
ீ ݃௜,௧,௕ − ߤ௜,௧,௕
ି ݃௜,௧,௕ + ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା ݃௜,௧,௕൯௜,௧,௕  (31) 
By multiplying both sides of (15) by ݀௧,௖ , summing for 
every ݐ and ܿ and rearranging some terms we get: 
∑ ߣ௧݀௧,௖௧,௖ = ∑ ൫ߣ௧,௖
஽ ݀௧,௖ + ߥ௧,௖
ି ݀௧,௖ − ߥ௧,௖
ା ݀௧,௖൯௧,௖  (32) 
By making use of (20) and (21), equation (31) becomes: 
∑ ߣ௧݃௜,௧,௕௜,௧,௕ = ∑ ൫ߣ௜,௕
ீ ݃௜,௧,௕ + ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା ݃௜,௕
௠௔௫൯௜,௧,௕  (33) 
By making use of (22) and (23), equation (32) becomes: 
∑ ߣ௧݀௧,௖௧,௖ = ∑ ൫ߣ௧,௖
஽ ݀௧,௖ − ߥ௧,௖
ା ݀௧,௖
௠௔௫൯௧,௖  (34) 
By substituting (33) and (34) into (30), we get the 
following linear objective function, which replaces the non-
linear objective function: 
∑ ൫ߣ௧,௖
஽ ݀௧,௖ − ߥ௧,௖
ା ݀௧,௖
௠௔௫൯௧,௖ − ∑ ൫ߣ௜,௕
ீ ݃௜,௧,௕ + ߤ௜,௧,௕
ା ݃௜,௕
௠௔௫൯௜,௧,௕  (35) 
The second non-linearity involves the bilinear terms in the 
complementarity conditions (20)-(29), which can be 
expressed in the generic form 0 ≤ ߤ ⊥ ݌ ≥ 0, with ߤ and ݌ 
representing generic dual and primal terms respectively. The 
linearization approach proposed in [9] is employed to replace 
each of these conditions with the set of mixed-integer linear 
conditions ߤ ≥ 0, ݌ ≥ 0, ߤ ≤ ߱ܯ஽ , ݌ ≤ (1 − ߱)ܯ௉ , where 
߱ is an auxiliary binary variable and ܯ஽  and ܯ௉  are large 
enough positive constants. The set of decision variables of the 
MILP formulation includes the set (13) as well as the 
auxiliary binary variables introduced for linearizing (20)-(29). 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
The presented case studies analyze the ability of ES to 
exercise market power through capacity withholding in a test 
market with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution, 
reflecting the general generation and demand characteristics 
of the GB power system [5]. Different scenarios are 
examined regarding the power rating and energy capacity of 
ES, while the assumed values for its other operating 
parameters are presented in Table I. The MILP formulation 
has been coded and solved using the optimization software 
FICOTM Xpress [10] on a computer with a 6-core 3.47 GHz 
Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5690 processor and 192 GB of RAM. The 
average computational time required for solving the MILP 
across all examined scenarios was approximately 30s. 
TABLE I.  ENERGY STORAGE PARAMETERS 
Parameter ܧ௠௜௡ ܧ௠௔௫ ܧ଴ ߟ௖ ߟௗ 
Value 0.2ܧ௖௔௣ ܧ௖௔௣ 0.25ܧ௖௔௣ 0.9 0.9 
 
A. Quantifying the Optimal Extent of Capacity Withholding 
by Energy Storage 
For a scenario with ݏ௠௔௫ = 6GW and ܧ௖௔௣ = 6GWh, three 
cases regarding the behavior of ES in the market are 
compared: i) competitive behavior, where the capacity 
withholding strategies are set equal to ݇௧ = 0,  ∀ݐ , ii) 
optimized strategic behavior, where the capacity withholding 
strategies are optimized through the model presented in 
Section III, and iii) naïve strategic behavior, where the 
capacity withholding strategies are set equal to an arbitrarily 
high value (in particular ݇௧ = 0.8,  ∀ݐ ). Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and 
Table II present the hourly storage charging / discharging 
dispatch (indicated by negative and positive values 
respectively), the hourly market clearing prices, and the daily 
storage profit respectively, under each of the three 
aforementioned cases. 
Under competitive behavior, the energy charged and 
discharged by ES during off-peak and peak hours 
respectively is the highest (leading to a flatter net demand 
profile), but the price differential between peak and off-peak 
hours is the lowest. Under naïve strategic behavior on the 
other hand, the energy charged and discharged by ES is the 
lowest, but the price differential between peak and off-peak 
hours is the highest. Under optimized strategic behavior, ES 
determines its capacity withholding strategies based on the 
optimal trade-off between these two effects. Although this 
strategy results in lower volumes of charging / discharging 
energy with respect to the competitive case and lower price 
differential with respect to the naïve strategic case, it yields 
the highest total profit for ES (Table II). This result 
demonstrates the significance of the proposed methodology in 
optimizing the profit of strategic ES in the market. 
 
Figure 2.  Hourly storage charging / discharging dispatch under different ES 
behaviors in the market 
 
Figure 3.  Hourly market clearing prices under different ES behaviors in the 
market 
TABLE II.  DAILY PROFIT OF ENERGY STORAGE UNDER DIFFERENT 
BEHAVIORS IN THE MARKET 
Competitive Optimized strategic Naïve strategic 
415,694 £/day 434,760 £/day 354,103 £/day 
 
Fig. 4 presents the capacity withholding strategies ݇௧ 
under optimized strategic behavior. It should be noted that 
during hours when ES neither charges nor discharges, (mid-
peak hours in general, e.g. hours 1-2, 7-16, and 20-23 in Fig. 
2), the value of ݇௧ does not affect the ES profit, as verified by 
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additional tests conducted by the authors; thus, Fig. 4 and 
similar figures in the remainder of this paper do not present 
any value for ݇௧ in these hours for the sake of clarity. On the 
other hand, the value of ݇௧ affects the ES profit during (off-
peak) hours when ES charges (e.g. hours 3-6 in Fig. 2) and 
(peak) hours when ES discharges (e.g. hours 17-19 in Fig. 2). 
The optimal extent of exercised capacity withholding is not 
the same across all off-peak and peak hours. It is noticed that 
the hours exhibiting the lowest extent of capacity withholding 
in the off-peak and the peak time window are hours 5 and 18 
respectively. The reason behind this trend is associated with 
the negative effect of capacity withholding on the volume of 
energy sold by ES, discussed in Section II. Since ES charges 
and discharges most of its energy at hours 5 and 18 
respectively (Fig. 2), it is motivated to act more truthfully 
during these hours. 
 
Figure 4.  Capacity withholding strategies under optimized strategic ES 
behavior 
D. Impact of ES Power Rating and Energy Capacity  
Two case studies are investigated in this section. In the 
first one, the optimal decision making problem of strategic 
ES has been solved using an ES energy capacity of ܧ௖௔௣ =
 6GWh, and different values for its power rating ݏ௠௔௫ , in 
order to investigate the impact of the latter on the extent of 
exercised market power. Fig. 5 presents the optimal capacity 
withholding strategies ݇௧ for each hour of the day and each 
power rating scenario. As the (actual) power rating of ES is 
increased, the value of ݇௧ during peak and off-peak hours also 
increases. This is because ES needs to enhance the extent of 
capacity withholding it exercises in order to maintain the 
peak to off-peak price differential at a high level and 
maximize its profit. 
As discussed in Section II, the exercise of market power 
by ES increases the price differential between peak and off-
peak hours and subsequently its profit, while simultaneously 
it decreases social welfare when compared to the case it 
behaves competitively. Fig. 6 presents the impact of ES 
power rating on the increase of the ES profit and the decrease 
of the social welfare driven by the exercise of capacity 
withholding. As the power rating increases from 1GW to 
4GW, the increase in ES profit and the decrease in social 
welfare are both enhanced, because its larger size enables ES 
to exercise more market power. Under competitive ES 
behaviour, increasing the ES power rating beyond 4GW 
cannot further flatten the demand profile and thus does not 
further change the operation schedule of ES. As a result, the 
power rating revealed by the ES to the market under strategic 
behaviour also remains unchanged; this is justified by the fact 
that the revealed rating, i.e. (1 − ݇௧)ݏ௠௔௫ , is identical for 
ݏ௠௔௫ = 4GW and ݏ௠௔௫ = 5GW at every hour. Therefore, the 
increase in ES profit and the decrease in social welfare driven 
by the exercise of market power exhibit a saturation effect for 
a power rating higher than 4GW (Fig. 6). 
 
Figure 5.  Impact of power rating on optimal capacity withholding strategies 
of ES 
 
Figure 6.  Impact of power rating on increase of ES profit and decrease of 
social welfare driven by the exercise of capacity withholding 
In the second case study, the optimal decision making of 
strategic ES has been solved using a storage power rating of 
ݏ௠௔௫ = 6GW, and different values for its energy capacity 
ܧ௖௔௣, in order to investigate the impact of the latter on the 
extent of exercised market power. Fig. 7 presents the optimal 
withholding strategies ݇௧ for each hour of the day and each 
energy capacity scenario. In contrast to the impact of 
increased power rating examined before, as the energy 
capacity is increased, the value of ݇௧  decreases. The reason 
behind this trend is associated with the negative effect of 
capacity withholding on the volume of energy sold by the ES 
unit in the market. As its capacity increases, ES is motivated 
to act more truthfully in order to exploit its higher energy 
content and sell more energy in the market. 
Fig. 8 presents the impact of ES energy capacity on the 
increase of the ES profit and the decrease of the social 
welfare driven by the exercise of capacity withholding. As 
the capacity increases from 6GWh to 54GWh, the increase in 
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ES profit and decrease in social welfare are both enhanced, 
because its larger size enables ES to exercise more market 
power. Under competitive ES behaviour, increasing the ES 
capacity beyond 54GWh cannot significantly improve the 
social welfare and therefore does not significantly change the 
operation schedule of ES. As a result, the revealed power 
rating under strategic behaviour also remains almost 
unchanged, as illustrated by Fig. 7, where the curves 
corresponding to 54GWh and 72GWh almost coincide. 
Therefore, the increase in ES profit and the decrease in social 
welfare driven by the exercise of market power exhibit a 
saturation effect for a capacity higher than 54GWh (Fig. 8). 
 
Figure 7.  Impact of energy capacity on optimal capacity withholding 
strategies of ES 
 
Figure 8.  Impact of energy capacity on increase of ES profit and decrease 
of social welfare driven by the exercise of capacity withholding 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In order to avoid the limitations of previous modeling 
approaches analyzing the market power potential of ES in 
electricity markets, this paper has developed a bi-level 
optimization model of the decision making process of strategic 
storage. This problem is solved after converting it to an MPEC 
and linearizing the latter through suitable techniques. 
Theoretical analysis in a simplified two-period market as well 
as case studies with the developed optimization model on a 
test market with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution 
demonstrate that ES needs to optimize the extent of exercised 
capacity withholding, in order to achieve the best trade-off 
between the positive effect of capacity withholding on peak to 
off-peak price differentials and its negative effect on the 
volume of energy sold by storage. Due to this negative effect, 
the optimal extent of capacity withholding is different at 
different periods of the market horizon, being lower during 
periods when ES charges and discharges higher energy. 
Case studies have analyzed the impact of the size of ES in 
terms of its power rating and energy capacity on the extent of 
exercised capacity withholding and the resulting increase in 
ES profit and decrease in social welfare. A higher power 
rating increases the extent of exercised capacity withholding 
as ES attempts to maintain the peak to off-peak price 
differential at a high level. On the other hand, a higher energy 
capacity reduces the extent of capacity withholding as ES is 
motivated to act more truthfully in order to exploit its higher 
energy content and sell more energy. Nevertheless, both a 
higher power rating and a higher energy capacity increase the 
additional profit made by storage and the social welfare loss 
(with respect to the case where ES acts competitively), since 
they increase the ability of storage to affect market prices. 
This trend however exhibits a saturation effect, as increasing 
power rating and energy capacity beyond a certain level does 
not affect the market outcome under neither competitive nor 
strategic storage behavior. 
Future work aims at enhancing the presented model in two 
directions. First of all, uncertainties faced by strategic storage 
participants regarding generation and demand conditions in 
the market will be incorporated in the developed model and 
stochastic optimization principles will be employed for its 
solution. Secondly, the presented model assumes that a single 
strategic storage participant exists in the market and the 
generation and demand participants behave competitively. In 
order to explore the role of ES in a more realistic oligopolistic 
market setting, future work will incorporate multiple strategic 
storage participants as well as strategic producers and 
consumers and will determine the market equilibria resulting 
from their interaction. 
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